Worker response to a menu of implicit contracts. by Link, Albert N. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
WORKER RESPONSE TO A MENU
OF IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
DON BELLANTE and ALBERT N. LINK*
The literature on implicit contracts between workers and firms suggests
that workers face a variety of such contracts, allowing each to choose the op-
timal trade-off between earnings level and earnings stability. This study tests
some implications of that theory through an examination of the risk behavior
of individual heads of households. The data source is the University of
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which includes a measure of the
worker's taste for risk avoidance. Additionally, several predictions derived
from Arrow's postulate of increasing relative risk aversion are examined. The
results confirm a tendency of risk-averse individuals to choose jobs offering
lower wages and lower financial risk. The results also provide indirect sup-
port for Arrow's postulate. The paper's findings suggest that studies of the
earnings effects of discrimination may possibly understate those effects, just
as studies of the value of a human life may understate that value.
A NUMBER of articles appeared almost
/vs imul taneously in 1974-75 on the
subject of implicit contracts between work-
ers and firms.' All sought to provide a ra-
tionale based on utility-maximizing be-
•Don Bellante is a professor of economics at Auburn
University and Albert Link is a professor of economics
at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
They appreciate helpful comments on earlier versions
by Timothy Deyak, Robert M. Feinberg. Barry Hirsch,
Fred Johnson, James E. Long, and J. Wilson Mixon.
'Costas Azariadis, "Implicit Contracts and Under-
employment Equilibria," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December 1975),
pp. 1183-1202; Martin Baily, "Wages and Employ-
ment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 37-
50; and Donald F. Gordon, "A Neo-Classical Theory
of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic Inquiry.
Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1974), pp. 431-59.
havior to explain the phenomenon of wage
inflexibility. These and the works that have
followed are a major contribution to the so-
lution of several paradoxes, problems, and
inconsistencies of macroeconomics. One of
the key tenets of contract theory is that wage
inflexibility is the result of optimal firm
behavior rather than the money illusions
and invidious comparisons of relative wages
by workers that were central to earlier Key-
nesian thought. Rather than being seen as
"taking advantage" of cyclical variations
in demand, as in an auction market, the firm
is viewed as offering stability to the large
majority of workers in exchange for lower
mean wages. The optimal mean wage-sta-
bility combination from the perspective of a
firm depends on characteristics (such as
stability of its industry's product demand)
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that vary across firms.̂  Consequently, as
Gordon points out, we should expect to see
the labor market characterized by a variety
of degrees of risk sharing between workers
and firms—in effect, a "menu" of implicit
contracts.^
The recognition of such a menu is in a
sense nothing new to economists. Numer-
ous studies of income distribution provide
empirical evidence of a trade-off between
earnings and security—or, more precisely,
a positive relation between mean earnings
and variability of earnings by occupation."i
Indeed, economists since Adam Smith have
speculated that the degree of financial risk
inherent in a particular occupation (as
with other nonpecuniary job character-
istics) should bring forth an "equalizing
difference" in the wage for that occupation
sufficient to compensate the marginal
worker for that risk. For nearly two centuries
this basic proposition regarding equalizing
differences was accepted in principle but no
empirical evidence was sought: perhaps not
only hecause of data availability problems
but also because of a presumption that the
forces determining wage differences were
simply too complex.^ Even in recent specu-
^Stability, of course, can come in the form of
either wage or employment stability. However, the
conditions under which employment stability would
totally dominate (resulting in full-employment con-
tracts) are highly restrictive and unlikely, as demon-
strated by Azariadis, "Implicit Contracts."
'Gordon, "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian
Unemployment," pp. 449-50.
••See, for example, Allan G. King, "Occupational
Choice, Risk Aversion, and Wealth," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 4 (July 1974), pp.
586-96; and Paul Taubman, Sources of Inequality in
Earnings (Amsterdam and New York: North Holland
and American Elsevier, 1975), pp. 95— 111.
*Most studies of nonwage characteristics use the
hedonic methodology as applied to the labor market
by Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen in "The Value
of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market," in
Nestor Terleckyj, ed.. Household Production and
Consumption (New York: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1975), pp. 265-98. Feinberg, for
example, after controlling for personal character-
istics, found that each one percent difference in the
coefficient of variation of the wage rate is positively
associated with a $.0435 difference in the hourly wage
rate. The mean hourly wage rateof his sample is $4.91,
indicating an elasticity at the mean of approximately
+.89. See Robert M. Feinberg, "Farnings-Risk as a
lation, the empirically observable differen-
tial that compensates for risk has been dis-
cussed as if it were generated entirely from
the labor-supply side of the market; firms in
industries with "inherently" highly vari-
able earnings have no choice but to pay the
wage premium demanded if they are to at-
tract the requisite number and quality of
employees. Contract theory recognizes the
ability of firms to "sell insurance" against
such variability and suggests the deter-
minants of the terms of such contracts. Ex-
positions of implicit contract theory, how-
ever, do not consider the variation in work-
ers' responses to the menu of contracts; that
is, workers are assumed to be homogeneous
with regard to taste for risk.̂  Such an as-
sumption does not allow predictions to be
made about the micro behavior of labor-
force participants in response to the menu:
specifically, the issue of which workers will
accept which contracts is left unexplored.
One purpose of this paper is to examine
the determinants of risk choice by individ-
uals. Of particular interest is the- relation
between job choice and variation in individ-
ual taste for risk. The analysis is cast in terms
of a job-choice model in which the selection
of a particular occupation-industry com-
bination is viewed as a selection of a certain
amount of risk. Implicit in contract theory is
the conclusion that the offering of a menu
of contracts is more efficient (not only from
the perspective of employers, but also from
that of workers) than would be the absence
of such contracts. Yet such a conclusion
would follow only if workers are viewed as
choosing jobs as if they have perceived and
rationally acted upon their available
choices. Our analysis will also shed light on
this question. In the remainder of this paper
we formulate and test a simple theoretical
model of risk choice.
Utility Maximization and Risk Choice
In what follows, we present a utility-
maximization model of job choice. An in-
dividual in selecting a job implicitly choos-
es a set of job characteristics, each of which
Compensating Differential," Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 (July 1981), pp. 156-63.
"Azariadis, "Implicit Contracts," p. 1186.
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affects the individual's total utility. Given
the idiosyncratic nature of labor markets
occurring as a consequence of differences in
specific training, workers are assumed for
simplicity to make a once-in-a-lifetime
choice of occupation and industry. Other
simplifying assumptions are that indivi-
duals' formal education (general train-
ing) is completed before final job selections
are made; that individuals have knowledge
of the distribution of lifetime earnings (with
regard to the mean and variance) within
each occupation-industry combination but
have no knowledge of wbere their income
will fall along that distribution; and that
workers expect intei'temporal stability in
the ordering of means and variances of earn-
ings across occupation-industry categories.
Financial risk (random variability in
earnings) is introduced as a direct argument
in the utility function; specifically, finan-
cial risk (hereafter referred to as risk) is
treated as an economic "bad." Our use of the
term risk refers to earnings variability due
not only to variation in the rate of pay, but
also to the influence of unemployment.
The designation of risk as a "bad" facili-
tates the conceptualization of a concave
indifference curve showing the trade-off
between risk and mean earnings.' Some con-
troversy exists over the indifference-curve
approach. Although we maintain the con-
cept ofa concave "good" versus "bad" trade-
off, we note below the implications of tbat
controversy for our analysis.
Assume an individual chooses an occu-
pation-industry combination so as to maxi-
mize total lifetime utility U:
(1) U = U(W,R,C),
where W is expected lifetime earnings (ex-
pressed as an annual rate), R is the coef-
ficient of variation of earnings associated
wi th a particular j ob choice, and C is a vector
of other nonwage, job-related character-
istics.' Following convention, it is assumed
'The use of such an indifference curve was popular-
ized (in the context of portfolio selection) hy James
Tobin in "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward
Risk," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2
(February 1958), pp. 65-85.
'We are assuming that the standard workweek
within an occupation-industry is employer-deter-
that C/'(W) > O;U"{W) < 0; and, assuming
risk aversion, U'{R) and U"{R) < 0.
If labor markets are dominated by the
risk averse, as available evidence suggests,
then an individual with given productivity-
related characteristics will face an oppor-
tunity locus exhibiting a positive relation
between mean earnings, W, and riskiness of
earnings, R, across occupational categories.
This relation, assumed for simplicity to be
linear, forms the multidimensional menu
of implicit contracts as:
n
(2) W = a + bR + ^ d,C, ,
where n is the number of nonwage char-
acteristics (other than risk) for which equal-
izing differences exist. The constant term, a,
can be thought of as the competitive risk-
free pure return on the given amount of
human capital possessed by the individual.
By maximizing Equation 1 subject to Equa-
tion 2, we yield the following relationship
among first-order conditions:
(3) u'{W) = - u'(Ryb = u'icyd, = \,
where X is a Lagrangian multiplier. It fol-
lows that utility maximization requires
that the rate at which individuals can ac-
quire additional annual earnings by ac-
cepting additional risk be equal to the rate at
which they are willing to do so: 6 = - U'(R)
/tJ'{W). Of two individuals facing the same
opportunity locus and whose utility func-
tions differ only in their tastes for risk, the
more risk-averse individual will choose a
point on the opportunity locus representing
a lower wage and a lower degree of vari-
ability in earnings than the point chosen
by tbe other individual.
Trade-offs can be derived between R and
the various C,'s (nonwage job character-
istics); however, these relationships besides
being obvious are of minor interest since,
across individuals, there is generally no
a priori expectation of a correlation between
the taste for financial risk and the taste for
various C,'s. One exception is job-related
mined as in Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Fringe Benefits and
Overtime Behavior (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1971), p. 5. Hence the employee's choice of
work hours for the most part is implicit in the job
choice.
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safety. Conceivably, an individual with a
relatively high aversion to risk may be will-
ing to pay a higher premium (that is, accept
a lower wage) to avoid both financial and
physical risk. Consequently, an individual
with a given degree of risk aversion will ac-
cept greater financial risk in a job choice
only if lower physical risk is obtained.
Individuals will, of course, face widely
differing opportunity loci. We are par-
ticularly interested in the manner in which
individuals respond to differences in oppor-
tunity sets. It is the individual's human
capital that determines the position of that
individual's opportunity set. The most
pertinent human-capital characteristic is
education; race and sex are also important
determinants of earnings capacity. Tbese
three variables together determine, for any
degree of financial risk, the potential earn-
ings of the individual.'
When differences in tastes are beld con-
stant, the response of individuals to differ-
ent opportunity loci is open to question.
Arrow's postulates of (1) decreasing absolute
risk aversion and (2) increasing relative
risk aversion help to clarify an answer.'"
Decreasing absolute risk aversion has gen-
erally been interpreted to mean that as their
wealth increases, people are willing to risk
(given certain odds and payoffs) a larger
absolute amount of that wealth. This be-
bavior directly suggests that an individual
with greater wealth, ceteris paribus, will
choose an occupation with a larger standard
deviation of earnings, provided that tbe
probability distribution of returns is ap-
proximately normal. This postulate of de-
creasing absolute risk aversion is generally
accepted.
Important for this study is the more con-
troversial second postulate, wbicb can best
be demonstrated if earnings risk is mea-
sured in terms of a coefficient of variation
in earnings. According to this postulate of
increasing relative risk aversion, as wealth
increases, the fraction of that wealth an
individual is willing to risk decreases. A
direct implication is that an individual
with greater wealth will choose an occupa-
tion with a small coefficient of variation.
Holding constant the level of nonhuman
wealth and the taste for risk, individuals
with bigher levels of education will choose
jobs with lower risk. Indeed, any factor that
tends to increase human capital and earn-
ings capacity prior to a career choice should
lead to individuals' choosing a lower degree
of risk, if tbe assumption of increasing rela-
tive risk aversion is correct." The validity of
Arrow's second postulate has been ques-
tioned, however. Although Arrow cites
empirical evidence in its favor, Stiglitz dis-
putes the use of that evidence.'^
Tbe presence of race or sex discrimination
will lower the earnings capacity and, bence,
the opportunity set of individuals subject
to such discrimination. The assumption of
increasing relative risk aversion then leads
to the conclusion that, when the taste for
risk-taking is held constant, blacks and
females will, ceteris paribus, choose riskier
jobs.
Otber factors may also affect risk cboice.
The existence of nonlabor income should
affect the occupation-industry choice if in-
creasing relative risk aversion is assumed,
but the effect is ambiguous. Clearly, the
presence of nonbuman wealth should lead
to a job cboice tbat provides a lower coef-
ficient of variation of total income, but the
effect of non-human wealtb on the coef-
ficient of variation of labor income—the
subject of this study—is indeterminate.
The same can be said of the effect of a
working spouse. Again if increasing rela-
'Human-capital studies usually include age or ex-
perience as a determinant of earnings capacity; how-
ever, age is irrelevant in a lifetime choice model.
'"Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-
Bearing (Chicago: Markham, 1971). pp. 90- 120.
"There has been some controversy as to whether
the concave indifference-curve approach to risk analy-
sis is consistent with Arrow's second postulate. Tohin
has pointed out that the validity of the indifference-
curve approach is maintained if the distribution of
possible outcomes is approximately normal. As we
explain below, the normality assumption appears
appropriate for the particular earnings-risk concept
employed in this study. See James Tobin, "Comment
on Borch and Feldslein." Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1969), pp. 13- 14.
'^Joseph E. Stiglitz, "The Effects of Income, Wealth,
and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking, " Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 83. No. 2 (May 1969),
pp. 263-83.
594 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
tive risk aversion is assumed, the earnings
of a working spouse should have a negative
effect on the family's chosen coefficient of
variation of total income but an indeter-
minate effect on the coefficient of variation
of the household head's labor income. It is
questionable, in fact, whether any empiri-
cally observable effect should be present,
since the validity of the above explanation
would depend on the assumption that the
career choices of husbands and wives are
jointly determined, a condition that is prob-
ably true in only a small minority of cases.
Keeping tbis caveat in mind, we acknowl-
edge the remote possibility exists that vari-
ability in the spouse's earnings may be a
factor in the household head's job choice.
Labor-force participation by both spouses
represents workers' only opportunity for
diversification in the labor market (aside
from moonlighting). A negative relation is
expected here. If the family is assumed to be
willing to bear only a certain amount of
overall risk, then the less variable tbe
spouse's income, the greater the amount of
risk that can be undertaken by tbe household
head in the selection of an occupation in-
dustry. The strength of that relation will
depend on the covariance of the two jobs.
Finally, marital status itself may affect
the choice of risk made by a bousehold head.
The non-insurable consequences of down-
side earnings risk may weigh more heavily
in the decision making of a married than a
single individual even if both individuals
have the same taste for risk. This factor will
be of empirical consequence only if it is true
that by and large workers correctly antici-
pate their future marital status and take it
into account when making their career
choices.
A number of predictions are thus derived
from the theory of utility maximization
under the condition of increasing relative
risk aversion. These predictions are tested
in the following section.
The Statistical Model and Data
The following reduced-form regression
model is used to test the propositions de-
veloped above concerning the choice of risk
implicit in job selection:
(4)
+ li.SEX +
jB sSEARN + fi^SCV +
where CV represents a coefficient of varia-
tion measuring the earnings riskiness of the
occupation-industry chosen by tbe house-
hold head; RA is a measure of the work-
er's aversion to risk; ACCD is the proba-
bility of incurring a work-related accident
in that particular occupation-industry
category; and ED, RACE, and S£X are the
variables representing buman capital and
earnings capacity. ED is the total formal
education of the household head. RA CE and
SEX are binary variables given a value of 1
for whites and males. MARST is a binary
variable given a value of 1 for a married
bousebold head whose spouse is present.
NLINC is the worker's nonlabor income in
tbe survey year. NLINC is not the ideal vari-
able to use in measuring the effect of non-
human wealth on career choice. The pre-
ferred measure—the individual's lifetime
nonlabor income anticipated prior to career
cboice, independent of any nonlabor in-
come generated as a return-to-savings from
labor income—is unobtainable. We would
expect, especially for older workers, tbat
return-to-previous-savings constitutes tbe
bulk of NLINC and is thus the result of the
career choice, rather than an exogenous
determinant of career choice. SEARN is the
spouse's earnings; SCV is the coefficient of
variation of earnings in the spouse's occupa-
tion-industry category; and ^ is a random
error term assumed to be normally dis-
tributed.
Below eacb coefficient is its predicted
sign, drawn from the model outlined in the
previous section. Equation 4 is thus a re-
duced-form equation that explains labor
market risk choice by including variables
accounting for differences, across individ-
uals, in opportunities and in tastes. Al-
though the right-hand variables are treated
as exogenous, the possibility of at least
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partial endogeneity exists. This partial
endogeneity would seem to hold true par-
ticularly with regard to physical risk, which
logically should be regarded as chosen
jointly with financial risk. This caveat
should be borne in mind in interpreting
the empirical results.
Three data sources were used to obtain
measures of tbe variables described in Equa-
tion 4: the 1972 Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID), produced by tbe Institute for
Social Research of the University of Michi-
gan; the 1970 Census 1-1000 Public Use
Sample (1-1000 Sample); and the 7977
Health Interview Survey (HIS), conducted
by the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. The primary data source
was the PSID, from which a sample was
selected of 2,771 household heads between
the ages of twenty-five and sixty-five in-
clusive.'^
There were two reasons for limiting the
sample to the twenty-five to sixty-five age
group. First, the inclusion of younger work-
ers would have contaminated the sample
with numerous individuals who have jobs
that do not reflect their ultimate choice of
career occupation and industry, as \vell as
with significant numbers of individuals
who have not yet completed their formal
education. Second, and more importantly,
previous researchers have found that the
non-normality of the income distribution
disappears when the distribution is con-
structed separately by occupation for indi-
viduals in tbe twenty-five to sixty-five age
range.'''Tbis finding of normality is of con-
siderable value, as it overcomes the objec-
tion raised to concave indifference-curve
analysis in asset-return studies that was
mentioned in footnote 11 above.
Eacb bousebold bead was assigned to one
of six general occupational categories spe-
"The PSID contains observations for a sample of
nearly 5,000 families. The reduction of sample size to
2,771 for this study was the result of deleting those
outside the twenty-five to sixty-five age range, those in
occupation-industry categories not compatible with
the other data sources we used, and those self-employed
or in the armed forces.
'*For example, see Stanley Lebergott, "The Shape of
the Income Distribution," American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June 1959), pp. 328-47.
cific to one of twenty-eight industry group-
ings.'^ The earnings-risk characteristic of
each of the resulting 168 occupation-in-
dustry categories was measured by a kind of
coefficient of variation of earnings for eacb
individual category. Measuring only a co-
efficient of variation in earnings for eacb of
the 168 groups would clearly be inappropri-
ate since it would include botb the variation
in earnings across individuals that is the
result of systematic earnings-related vari-
ables (such as education and experience) and
the variation that is the result of true risk. To
purge the systematic, non-risk variation, we
employed a separate earnings equation for
each occupation-industry category. The
coefficient of variation of the residuals
about the regression line (CV) was then
calculated. The data used in this part of the
analysis were taken from the 1-1000 Sample
rather than the PSID in order to obtain
more efficient estimates of each equation.
The 89,387 individuals in ihe 1-1000 Sample
are classified by occupation-industry cate-
gory, and tbe following earnings equation
was estimated separately for each of the 168
groups:
(5) log (EARN) = a o + a | £ D +
a^RACE
+ a^SEX +
where EARN represents each worker's an-
nual earnings; EXP is that worker's job
experience estimated as age less years of
education completed less five; and | is a
random error term assumed to be normally
distributed.
An index of risk aversion, RA, for each
household head was obtained from tbe
PSID. That index is formulated on the basis
of answers to an assortment of questions
concerning the condition and instirance of
automobiles owned, the use of seat belts,
the household head's extent of medical in-
surance coverage, and his or her smoking
and drinking babits. The index ranges from
zero to nine, nine representing the highest
degree of risk aversion. Feinberg used the
index as a measure of risk aversion in a study
'*A listing of the occupation-industry categories
used is available from the authors upon request.
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of one aspect of labor market behavior—
duration of joh search—and it performed as
predicted.'^ Bellante and Link used it in a
study of the choice of employment sector
(public versus private) and also found the
variable to perform as predicted."
Tbe physical risk associated with a par-
ticular occupation-industry category was
measured as the matbematical probability
of incurring a job-related accident (ACCD).
This variable, like CV, can assume one of
168 distinct values. ACCD was calculated
from tbe HIS. From tbat sample of 64,441
individuals, tbe 40,633 classified as workers
were selected and assigned to one of the 168
occupation-industry categories. From re-
sponses to the question "Did you have
(within the year) an accident or injury at
work?", the probability of a job-specific
accident was calculated. This measure
weights accidents equally regardless of their
severity. An alternative measure, ACCDsev,
was calculated accordingly as the proba-
bility that an individual had had an acci-
dent or injury forwhich hospitalization was
required. Both measures of physical risk
are used in the following analysis. The co-
efficient of variation of the spouse's occupa-
tion-industry category, SCV, was measured
analogously to CV.
Empirical Results
The ordinary least squares results cor-
responding to Equation 4 are reported in the
first two columns of the table. Tbe column
"Robert M. Feinberg, "Risk Aversion, Risk, and the
Duration of Unemployment," Review of Economics
and Statistics. Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1977), pp. 264-
71.
"Don Bellante and Albert N. Link, "Are Public
Sector Workers More Risk Averse than Private Sector
Workers?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1981), pp. 408-12. The risk-
avoidance index is described and documented in James
N. Morgan et al., A Panel Study of Income Dynamics:
Tape Codes and Indexes, Vol. II (Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1972), p. 791.
A rather exhaustive examination of the risk-avoidance
index is provided by Al Arterburn, "Correlates of a
Risk Avoidance Index," in Greg J. Duncan and James
N. Morgan, eds.. Five Thousand American Families:
Patterns of Economic Progress, Vol. Ill (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Survey Researcb Center, 1976).
pp. 351-382.
labelled (1) uses ACCDdiS the accident prob-
ability measure and tbe column labelled (2)
uses ACCDsev. Since the results of both col-
umns are similar, only tbose in column 1
will be discussed.
The estimated coefficient on RA is nega-
tive, as hypothesized, and significant at the
.01 level. It would be misleading to attempt
an economic interpretation of tbe value of
tbe coefficient because of tbe manner in
which RA is constructed. The results never-
theless suggest that those individuals who
are more risk averse choose jobs that are
subject to less cavningsxisk, ceteris paribus.
Tbe estimated coefficient on ACCD is
negative, as hypothesized, and significant at
the .01 level. The results imply that a per-
centage-point increase in the probability of
a job-related accident (of any degree of sever-
ity) decreases tbe earnings risk an individual
will accept in an occupation-industry
cboice by about 2.4 percentage points. Us-
ing ACCDsev, tbe estimated coefficient
implies that a percentage-point increase in
the probability of a severe accident will de-
crease the earnings risk chosen by the in-
dividual by about 10.5 percentage points. As
would be expected, the coefficient on
ACCDsev is numerically greater than that
on ACCD. The results with respect to A CCD
and ACCDsev should be interpreted witb
caution. Botb are almost certainly highly
correlated with the probability of a fatal
accident, particularly ACCDsev They may,
therefore, actually be measuring the effects
of "unsafe" working conditions—whether
of a severe, nonsevere, or fatal type— on the
choice of earnings risk.
All three of the human-capital and earn-
ings capacity variables—ED, RACE, and
SEX—bave tbe negative signs predicted
and are significant at tbe .01 level. The esti-
mated coefficient on MARST also has the
predicted negative sign and is significant at
the .01 level. NLINC is insignificant. The
extent to wbicb tbis insignificance is due to
our inability to measure correctly tbe rele-
vant variable is open to question. Tbe co-
efficient of SEARN is positive and signifi-
cant at the .01 level. The coefficient of SCF,
as predicted, is negative. It is significant
only at the .05 level in column 1, bowever.
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Table. Results of Regressions Estimating Determinants of Earnings Variation
Among Household Heads,
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Variables
Intercept
RA
ACCD
ACCD sev
ED
RACE
SEX
MARST
NLINC
SEARN
SCV
R'
F-level
Annual
(1)
6.41
-.1013**
(-6.03)
-2.40**
(-9.24)
-
-.1039**
(-13.05)
- .4307**
(-7.49)
- .7588**
(-6.79)
- .2746**
(-2.55)
.0000+
(.75)
.0373**
(2.77)
- .0261*
(-2.23)
.270
113.37
Estimated
Earnings
(2)
6.00
-.0915**
(-5.39)
-
- 10.49**
(-4.66)
-.0919**
(-11.62)
-.4012**
( - 6.90)
-.7910**
(-6.99)
- .3097**
(-2.85)
.0000+
(.89)
.0359**
(2.63)
- .0227
(-1.91)
.253
103.96
Coefficients
Hourly
(3)
.2844
- .0055**
(-5.10)
-.1281**
(-7.66)
-
- .0045**
(-8.85)
-.0314**
(-8.47)
- .0893**
(-12.39)
- .0203**
(-2.94)
.0000+
(.45)
.0005
(.70)
-.0109
(-.65)
.339
157.32
Wages
(4)
.2692
-.0051**
(-4.74)
-
-1.34**
(-9.37)
- .0043**
(-8.63)
- .0293**
(-7.94)
- .0873**
(-^2.16)
_ 0211**
(-3.07)
.0000+
(.47)
.0004
(.59)
- .0090
(-.54)
.346
162.09
*Significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Significant at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.
and misses the .05 level in column 2.
The results of columns 1 and 2 of the table
strongly suggest a tendency of labor market
participants to respond systematically to the
variety of implicit contracts offered in the
labor market. It should be noted, though,
that the extent of unemployment in an oc-
cupation-industry category is a primary
source of variation of earnings in that cate-
gory. Although our arguments apply with
equal validity to any source of variation in
earnings, our findings would be substan-
tially less interesting ii CV were a mere
proxy for the unemployment rate in a par-
ticular category since the human-capital
and demographic determinants of unem-
ployment have been examined in great de-
tail elsewfiere.'* Tfie equations in columns
1 and 2 were reestimated to examine tfiis
possibility by using tfie adjusted coeffi-
cient of variation of fiourly wage rates in-
stead of annual earnings as tfie dependent
variable. These results are presented in col-
umns 3 and 4 of tfie table (with column 3
analagous to column 1 and column 4 to
"Moreover, the literature on implicit contracting
seems more directly concerned with wage-rate stability
than with overall earnings stability, though the oppo-
site is true in tbe usual "textbook" labor economics
discussion.
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column 2). The results conform in a quali-
tative manner quite closely to those of the
equations using annual earnings, except
for the fact that SCV and SEARN hecome
insignificant. R̂  is significantly raised.
These findings suggest that the response of
lahor market participants to risk is a gener-
alized response and is not limited to earn-
ings variation attrihutahle to different un-
employment rates.'^
Concluding Remarks
The development of implicit contract
theory has provided a rationale, from the
employer side, for the existence of a menu of
implicit contracts from which workers can
choose to trade off mean earnings for earn-
ings stahility. The results of this study lead
to the conclusion that labor market partici-
pants demonstrate a tendency to perceive
and act upon the menu of choices hefore
them. This finding adds some strength to
the contention that in the highly idiosyn-
cratic lahor markets prevalent in the U.S.
economy, the existence of that possihle
trade-off may be Pareto-superior to a regime
of auction markets. Our conclusions fall
under categories pertaining to the findings
and methodology of this study and the im-
plications of our findings for other lahor
market studies.
The findings. Using the PSID index of
risk avoidance as our measure of taste for
risk aversion, we find that those workers
who are more risk averse exhihit a tendency
to choose less financially risky jobs, ceteris
paribus. Furthermore, workers with a given
degree of risk aversion exhihit a willingness
to trade off physical risk against financial
risk. It appears that the average worker, at
the margin, would accept a 10.5 percent
higher degree of variability in earnings (in
"Several other versions of Equation 4 were esti-
mated. One version, for example, limited the sample to
male heads of households. These alternative estima-
tions did not produce results materially different from
those reported in the table. In another set of specifica-
tions, we entered RA as a set of dummy variables. Alter-
native versions were considered that included from one
to six such variables. In all cases, the order of magni-
tude was as predicted, but R̂  was raised by about one
percentage point or less over the version reported in the
table. These results are available from the authors.
terms of a coefficient of variation) in ex-
change for a one percent lower probability
of a severe accident. Provisions for hoth
safer working conditions and earnings
stability are costly to firms. It is apparent,
nevertheless, that firms can induce workers
to accept a certain degree of physical risk not
only by offering a higher wage, hut also hy
offering earnings stahility. The relative
attractiveness of the two approaches will
vary across industries, of course, hut when-
ever a disparity exists between workers'
marginal rates of substitution and firms'
marginal rates of transformation, potential
gains from making a trade exist. Indeed,
the negative correlation we found hetween
physical risk and earnings risk by occupa-
tion-industry category indicates that to
some degree firms are compensating for
physical risk hy offering less earnings risk.
Of course any undesirable attribute of a joh
will require compensation, and a wage
premium is but one form of compensation.
This fact should be borne in mind in any
study of compensating wage differentials.
It seems quite reasonable to assume, on the
other hand, that compensation for safety
hazards will be at least partly in the form of
earnings stability, since both attributes
(safety and earnings stability) relate to the
psychological desire to avert risk.
Arrow's second postulate of increasing
relative risk aversion served as the main-
tained hypotheses of this study; and the
strongest predictions derived here were neg-
ative relations between earnings-capacity
variables (education, race, and sex) and the
degree of earnings risk implicit in the joh
choice. The significantly negative coef-
ficients for these variables are thus uni-
formly consistent with increasing relative
risk aversion and therefore provide indirect
evidence from the lahor market (the only
such evidence of which we are aware) in sup-
port of the second postulate.
The methodology. The most common ap-
proach in cross-sectional studies of individ-
ual behavior that employ the utility-maxi-
mization framework is to derive a reduced-
form equation containing (1) a set of inde-
pendent variables to control for differ-
ences in economic constraints or oppor-
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tunities across individuals and (2) a set of
independent variables of a demographic
nature intended partially to control for dif-
ferences in tastes across demographic
groups. The implicit assumption (or per-
haps hope) in using the second set of vari-
ables is that within demographic groups
the effects of differing economic constraints
will swamp differences in tastes. One prob-
lem in using this set is that demographic
variables (such as race, age, and sex) per-
form "double duty" since they capture dif-
ferences in tastes as well as differences in
constraints; the scope of conclusions that
can be drawn is therefore limited. We have
departed from this standard methodology by
using a more direct proxy for the one taste
parameter—risk aversion—most closely
tied to our dependent variable, risk choice.
Although psychologists and sociologists
have traditionally placed great reliance on
attitude surveys, we share the suspicions of
many economists regarding their use. Surely
the PSID measure could he improved upon;
to our knowledge, however, the PSID is
the only large economics micro data set that
contains any sort of measure of risk aver-
sion. Our results with this variable should
be treated cautiously; but considered to-
gether with Feinherg's, they suggest the
potential fruitfulness of including in micro
data sets attempted measures of this and
other psychological variables such as in-
ternal rates of time preference. The PSID
index of risk avoidance in particular should
be subjected to close study before it is ac-
cepted more than tentatively. In the mean-
time, some confidence in its validity will be
gained if it is successfully employed in other
unrelated studies of economic behavior.
Implications. Our findings have implica-
tions for other labor market studies. The
literature ahounds with studies of race and
sex discrimination that compare hlack/
white or male/female earnings ratios after
controlling for as many productivity-related
variables as possible. It is sometimes alleged
that the use of the residual difference over-
estimates the effect of discrimination on
earnings.^" Our results may be interpreted as
suggesting that these studies in one respect
underestimate the impact. The negative
coefficients we found for race and sex sug-
gest that blacks and women who are heads
of households partially offset the effects of
reduced earnings opportunities hy accept-
ing greater risk, for which they are com-
pensated. The victims are in effect "repur-
chasing" some of the earnings potential
taken away hy discrimination by accepting
riskier jobs than those they otherwise would
accept. To date, studies of discrimination do
not take this compensating differential into
account;^' nor do they take into account the
compensating differentials associated with
other unfavorahle joh characteristics ac-
cepted as mitigation of discrimination's
effects.
A similar remark can be made with re-
spect to studies such as Thaler and Rosen's
of wage differentials that compensate for
differences in occupational safety. Our
results suggest that employers compensate
for physical hazards not only hy paying
higher wages, hut also by providing greater
wage stability. If this implication is correct,
such studies are, ceteris paribus. underesti-
mating the compensating differential (in
terms of employers' costs) necessary to
induce workers to accept an increment of
physical risk.
'"For example, see Joe C. Davis and Carl M. Hub-
bard. "On the Measurement of Discrimination against
Women," American Journal of Economics and Soci-
ology, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July 1979), pp. 287-91.
^'One possible remedy to this problem would be to
include the valtie of our dependent variable, CF, in
the earnings eqtiations tised in discrimination studies.

